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1 Introduction
It is a curious fact that in June 2003, 20 years
into Sri Lanka’s armed conflict, the country’s
military leadership chose to introduce their
forces as ‘ceremonial institutions since
independence’.1 Today, such a narrative is no
longer tenable or desirable. How do we
understand this change and what issues does it
foreground particularly on gender and security in
Sri Lanka? That the narrative of ceremoniality is
heard less often reflects a military turn in the
country, which complements the determination
of both the Sri Lankan government and the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) for a
decisive ‘final battle’ that will end the 25-year
war. It also points to the significant shifts that
have taken place in the Sri Lankan military, its
current ethos as a hardened and modernised
fighting force, and its central role in the nation’s
imaginary. In the emerging security regime
driven by these forces, there is a vivid interplay
of security and gender: of masculinised
militarism and gendered insecurity that have
their corollary in violence against women and the
marginalisation of women’s labour. This article
explores these issues, first by marking the new
security paradigm in Sri Lanka, and second by
examining the Free Trade Zones in the south of
the country where the feminisation of labour and
masculinisation of security concur, and where
security is marketed as a public good in a
manner which elicits consent for the
militarisation of society as a whole. The ‘social
imaginary’ that results is constitutive, in turn, of
deeply gendered fault lines.
2 The Sri Lanka military: entangled
temporalities, multiple identities
The popular narrative of the Sri Lanka military
as a ceremonial institution until the first Janatha
Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP)2 insurrection in 1971
and more pertinently until the 1983 separatist
war, denies its true antecedents. During British
colonial rule, security in Ceylon rested on a
volunteer rather than regular armed force. But
this volunteer force was called out on many
instances to quell anti-British ‘riots’ as in 1818,
1848 and 1915. In 1915 in the aftermath of
Sinhala–Muslim clashes and anti-colonial
agitation, the military was incorporated as a unit
of utmost value when martial law was declared.
The regular force of the Sri Lanka Army came
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into effect in 1949, one year after independence.
Almost immediately, whether in its first
operational role of preventing an influx of ‘illicit’
immigrants from India in 1952 or in containing
anti-state dissent in the hartal of 1953, the
agitation at Gal Oya in 1956, or the Emergency
of 1958, its engagement in securing Sri Lanka’s
borders and the state brought it face to face with
Tamil dissent. During the Emergency of 1958
precipitated by Sinhala–Tamil clashes, the
military was under state orders to ‘shoot and
shoot to kill’ (Vittachi 1958: 55–6). This was also
the first time in an independent Sri Lanka that
military officers were gazetted as coordinating
officers of provinces, thereby superseding the
government agents of those provinces who were
drawn from the civil service (SLAC 1999: 102).
Given this show of force, which continued into
the 1960s,3 what made it possible to represent
the Sri Lanka military as ceremonial? Until the
first JVP insurrection of 1971, the security forces
were not meaningfully modernised (SLAC 1999:
300), and not until after 1983 and the 1987–9
second JVP insurrection had it to face organised
armed combatants on a significant scale. One
could argue therefore that the description of
ceremoniality carried the trace of non-combat.
But the use and exchange value of this term
(primarily by those in power rather than by those
oppressed by the military), point to far more
complex structural features, which underpin
militaries today.
One such feature is of the multiple temporalities
and identities that modern militaries inhabit. In
Sri Lanka, although deployed as a tool of social
and political control, the military did not
automatically enjoy superiority over civilian
authority until relatively recently. There were
instances of deference to civilian power even at
heightened moments of military engagement,
which underscored the army’s commitment to
democratic constitutionality. For example,
during the Emergency of 1958, despite the
powers it vested on the military, faced with a
3,000-strong crowd, the commander of the army
unit in Pollonnaruwa requested written
permission first from the government agent to
open fire before ordering his men to do so
(Vittachi 1958: 43). In 1962, following the
abortive coup, the army leadership distanced
itself from the rebel faction within it,
acknowledged damage to its reputation and
initiated public image-building exercises to
restore confidence in the institution (SLAC 1999:
163).4 Much later, in 1989 when a Major General
wanted the Ops Combine to be centralised under
his sole authority in order to effectively fight the
JVP, his request was granted but not without
‘some delay and exchange of letters’
(Chandraprema 1991: 301). Such actions
enabled the army, even as it resorted to hardline
tactics against the rebel JVP and LTTE, to
simultaneously inhabit multiple registers of
discourse and when required, trace a ceremonial
history, assert its commitment to the
constitution and draw attention to its leadership
as ‘officers and gentlemen’. It thereby also
forwarded a gendered ethos, which privileged
elite males and masculinity.
In such state–military relations, the military
became both central and auxiliary to the
purposes of governments, available for battle and
a return to barracks.5 It was permitted to think of
itself on dual registers: as honourable men who
safeguarded the constitution and deferred to
elected civilian authority, and as combatants who
dirtied their hands in battle, which allowed the
ordinary soldier as much of a chance as the elite
officer to become a Rana Viru or War Hero. Even
as its excesses in exterminating insurgency and
separatism were ignored and/or actively
promoted, the Sri Lanka military was encouraged
to embrace a humanitarian vocabulary central to
the moulding of modern, professional militaries
today (Kennedy 2004: 268). This has not meant,
as David Kennedy notes, that we cannot ‘often
tell who is speaking … as if a tune were being
played in slightly different keys. We can hear the
voice of victory and the voice of virtue’ (Kennedy
2004: 282). But the multiple registers and
entangled temporalities the military inhabits as it
conjures up both ceremoniality and martial
valour, both humanitarian outlook and
militarised efficiency, are important to note. They
provide an understanding of militarisation as a
dynamic process in which the military can be
marketed in different ways all containing traces
that, together with contingency, can play a part in
how the current military turn in Sri Lanka
intensifies or abates.
3 The military turn
Sri Lanka’s current security regime is boosted by
an absence of serious political will towards a
negotiated settlement to the ethnic conflict.
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Inevitably state–military relations have moved
closer towards installing states of exception as
the norm. The military turn is one of its effects,
particularly evident in the eastern province after
the victory for government forces at Thoppigala.6
Martial law was not declared, but the Sri Lanka
army was empowered to act for the state. In July
2007, the military commander of the eastern
province notified local civil administrators that
his office ‘would have the final say on which
humanitarian and development NGOs [non-
governmental organisations] were allowed to
work in the areas recently re-taken from the
LTTE’ (ICG 2008). Ministry of Defence approval
had to be obtained prior to all visits by
international NGOs to the east. Similarly in
Jaffna (as well as portions of the eastern province
recaptured from the LTTE) the Sri Lanka
military issued its own photo identification card
which residents are required to carry in addition
to the standard national identity card (NIC).7 In
tandem with such developments, the LTTE also
commanded a significant presence within civilian
institutions in areas it controlled. Two or more
LTTE operatives functioned as grama sevakas
(village administrators) in each village in full
possession of details of all households, etc. by
virtue of their office (Jeyaraj 2007a: 6). What is
evident here is a constitutive characteristic that
Achille Mbembe noted of the post-colony: of a
‘form of government [which] forces features
belonging to the realm of warfare and features
proper to the conduct of civil policy to coexist in a
single dynamic’ (Mbembe 2001: 74).
4 Life and law in the free trade zones
The free trade zones (FTZs) in the south of Sri
Lanka are sites where this particular form of
governance, in which national security and public
policy are sutured into violence, militarised
surveillance and coercion, take on particularly
gendered forms. The FTZs are where many of the
garment factories under Sri Lanka’s Garment
Factory Program (GFP) are situated. The GFP
was inaugurated in 1992 as a response to
unemployment, poverty and male youth unrest
that led to the second JVP insurrection of 1987–9.
Despite its initial objective to provide
employment to rural Sri Lankan male youth,
President R. Premadasa mandated that each
factory should employ 450 women and 50 men
(Lynch 2004: 170).8 Consequently, significant
numbers of rural Sri Lankan women began
working in the semi-urban FTZ garment
factories. Epitomising the feminisation of labour,
enduring oppressive work and living conditions,
which approximate, according to one female
worker, a ‘slave camp’ (Hewamanne and Brow
2001: 21), these women suffer alienation and
social stigma. Commonly referred to as ‘garment
girls’ or juki kello,9 they are accorded diminutives
that refuse to recognise them as members of a
significant political community. Such a politics of
recognition has led to the FTZ women being
constituted primarily as sexualised subjects. In
turn they have elicited public disapproval
amounting to a ‘moral panic’ at the
transformations that have taken place in their
lives as a result of migration from the villages
and their financial independence, etc. The
‘garment girls’ became subjects of derision, and
in the 1990s were the pivot around which taunts
and rejoinders about Sri Lanka’s insertion into a
transnational economy were publicly bandied and
a moral politics on the degradation of young
Sinhala Buddhist women under neoliberalism
launched (Lynch 2007: 91–120, 2004: 113–16).
Attempting to survive the cycle of poverty and
harsh labour, the FTZ women often look to
relationships with army men, popularly referred
to as the ‘army boys’. This diminutive however,
unlike the ‘garment girls’, is a term of affection.
Moreover, as Rana Viru (War Heroes), these
military men are vested with tremendous social
capital that the women do not enjoy. Although
the women contribute in large measure to the
nation’s foreign exchange earnings, because the
men are entrusted with its security during times
of war, they are accorded hyper-recognition in a
militarised public sphere at the expense of the
women whose labour remains unrecognised and
undervalued. This is a gendered hierarchy
endorsed by the military itself, which accepts
that it is the duty of these women to serve and
nurture military men. It is common practice for
military vehicles to drop off male soldiers after
hours at garment factories, positioning garment
factory women as extensions of camp followers.
In turn, the women often look to the military
men and their socioeconomic status as paths
towards their own upward social mobility. Their
gendered insecurity feeds into a paradigm where
the militarised male is looked upon as the
protector and provider of security even as the
women suffer domestic violence, unwanted
pregnancies and rejection at the hands of these
men. These experiences, depicted forcefully in
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Sinhala language films, such as Asoka
Handagama’s Me Mage Sandai (This is My Moon)
(2001), Satyajith Maitipe’s Bora Diya Pokuna
(Scent of the Lotus Pond) (2003) and Inoka
Satyangani’s Sulang Kirilli (Maidens of the Wind)
(2002) provide vivid examples of the fraught
entanglements of security, gender, life and law
within the FTZs.
The women respond to their condition in
complex ways. On the one hand they sport a
subversive deportment that flaunts their
garment factory worker status in the face of
public denigration (Hewamanne 2003: 76–80,
2008a: 179). On the other, they demonstrate
docility and compliance, which affirm their
suitability as marriage partners (Hewamanne
and Brow 2001: 22). Forming relationships with
military men and seeking militarised protection
is also a way in which the FTZ women attempt to
evade the gendered violence and verbal abuse
often directed at them in public. These
relationships with military men reflexively
confer on the women a ‘respectability’ within a
social imaginary that allots value to martial
virtue, patriotism and duty during times of war.
Citing examples of how women workers observed
two minutes of silence on a factory floor for their
brothers and boyfriends in the military, despite
objections from the factory supervisor, trips to
Buddhist temples to invoke blessings on the
army, and their relationships with military men,
these women become in effect ‘good women’ by
offering support to men on the battlefront
(Hewamanne 2008b).
Such a repertoire of activities, including the
strategic use of a legitimising narrative on
patriotism towards an act of resistance on the
factory floor, enables the women to reconcile the
tension between their stigmatised reputations
and dutifulness as citizens in times of war
(Hewamanne 2008b). They endorse a social
imaginary towards a sense of the common good
(Taylor 2004: 23). That this common good is
sutured into militarism, and that the women’s
resistance incorporates forms of desire that
accept the authority of militarisation, illustrate
Saba Mahmood’s argument that in locating
women’s agency, ‘it is important to interrogate
the practical and conceptual conditions under
which different forms of desire emerge, including
desire for submission to recognised authority’
(Mahmood 2005: 15). The popular construction
of FTZ women as sexualised subjects constitutes
such a set of conditions under which militarism
gains value because of its transactional ability to
confer respectability on the FTZ women who
display loyalty to military boyfriends, even if it
means violence and rejection at their hands. The
rejection most often stems from the fact that
while military men are happy to have affairs with
FTZ women, they do not see them as worthy
marriage partners, preferring instead to choose
wives from a pool of women who work as school
teachers and/or public servants and thereby
enjoy social prestige.
The impermanent nature of these relationships
resonates with the sense of alienation and
transience that characterises FTZ life
(Abeysekera 2005: 24–5) Given the conditions of
labour, the FTZ women view the factory work as
temporary.10 Under the constant threat of
summons to the battlefront, mobility also
characterises the sojourn of the army men. But it
is precisely this fluidity and the absence of
familial structures and surveillance of the village
that affords them the opportunity of new
relationships. The women also form close
friendships with other women workers who are
lodged in the same boarding houses, while
camaraderie as a valued principle of a military
corps encourages the army men to develop close
masculine bonds with military colleagues. In a
context where traditional labour unions have
been weakened, alternative ways of organising
labour provided by women’s groups, drop-in
centres and self-awareness/education centres
within the FTZ also encourage the women into
new forms of membership and socialite. Yet,
there also exists a tension between regularity
and provisionality. The very open-endedness of
the outcomes of these collaborations holds forms
of ‘not knowing [which] is where the notion of
uncertainty lies and uncertainty is how risk is
shaped’ (Patel 2007: 103). Exactly how risk,
gendered insecurity and their corollary in
violence are experienced in the ‘everyday’ by
these FTZ women was brought out starkly with
the rape and murder of 22-year-old garment
factory worker Chamila Dissanaike, and its
aftermath.
The Chamila Dissanaika case highlights the
extent of the security dilemma faced by FTZ
women when their personal security has been
eroded by the very public institutions charged
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with safeguarding it. Chamila, who sought
treatment at the Negombo base hospital, the
main public medical facility available to FTZ
women working in the Seeduwa area, was raped
by the doctor she consulted, dragged through a
corridor and flung out of a sixth floor window to
her death. In the aftermath of this crime, a web
of authority functioned to sanction violence
against FTZ women. It was learnt that the doctor
had a history of sexually abusing women to which
the authorities had turned a blind eye
(Jayasinghe 2007). Thereafter a janitor who had
worked for five years at the hospital and had
witnessed the doctor drag Chamila along the
corridor, was dismissed from her job.
This prompted several waves of protest by FTZ
workers. A thousand-strong crowd participated in
a demonstration three days later that was to end
at the hospital but was stopped by the police at
Mal Farm junction (Lankadeepa 2006; Silumina
2006). Following the janitor’s dismissal from her
job, the FTZ and General Services Employees
Union launched a campaign of protest. Her
dismissal not only resonated with job insecurity
as a general condition for women working within
the FTZ, but it was also recognised as a move to
obstruct justice. The doctor, who had been
remanded and had attempted suicide in his cell,
had later been warded at a mental health
institution and deemed unfit for trial. All of this
prompted the FTZ and General Services
Employees Union to call in a letter for a public
demonstration by FTZ women on 8 March 2008,
International Women’s Day, to highlight the
issues of the Chamila case, the public image
(samaja garuthwaya) of FTZ women and their
gendered insecurity (anaarakshithabhavaya). In an
interview with the BBC Sinhala Sandeshaya
service, one of Chamila’s friends linked the
systemic devaluing of FTZ women’s labour and
violence against women and stated bitterly ‘We
are treated like toys. That is why my friend faced
an unfortunate death. Society should take action
to prevent these things happen[ing] to us. We
contribute to [the] Sri Lankan economy and we
deserve better recognition and respect’.11
Despite these waves of anger and protest, the
twin rationalities of globalisation and
militarisation, which animate the FTZs and the
masculinised patriarchies they endorse, work to
rein in the necessary female workforce. But on
what terms is such a potentially volatile
workforce kept in check and secured? To begin
with, the many instances of women’s ‘consent to
patriarchies’ as Kumkum Sangari notes, ‘is often
an effect of the anticipation of violence, or the
guarantee of violence in the last instance – to
ensure obedience, inculcate submission, punish
transgression’ (Sangari 2008: 3, my emphasis).
This enables ‘Patriarchies [to] rest equally on
consent by women, violence against women, and
on legitimating ideologies’ (Sangari 2008: 3).
What are these legitimating ideologies that work
to elicit women’s consent to the status quo even as
they organise against its sanction of gender-
based violence? Foremost is the promise of the
‘good life’ within neoliberal promise, which
depends, to quote Sangari, ‘on both active
consumers and a docile labour force’ (Sangari
2008: 17). And if, as Chandra Mohanty noted,
‘global assembly lines are as much about the
production of people as they are about ‘providing
jobs’ or making profit’ (Mohanty 2003: 141),
then this ‘production of people’ is about shaping
a social imaginary that, within the context of the
Sri Lankan FTZs, entices women into a Faustian
pact with militarism.
5 Militarism and the good life
What are the terms of this bargain? And how
does the state mediate and monitor its contract
imbricating the good life and militarism as two
public goods that in turn conjure a powerful new
social imaginary? If Shakespeare’s Prospero (the
archetype imperialist) provides clues to how the
modern state ‘oscillates’ as Veena Das notes,
‘between a rational mode and a magical mode of
being’ (Das 2006: 162), Achille Mbembe points
to mechanisms such as salary and privilege in a
postcolonial state as ‘gift[s], when examined
closely, allocated for the purpose of
institutionalising a form of domination having its
own rationality’ (Mbembe 2001: 54, my
emphasis). The social and economic capital
enjoyed by military men in Sri Lanka is a direct
effect of such ‘gifts’ or allotments by a state fully
committed to the war effort. Reports that
civilian men pose as military ones to seduce FTZ
women (Pereira and de Silva 2007: 10) highlight
the currency Sri Lankan military men enjoy over
their civilian counterparts. In an economy
characterised by a shrinking public sector, the
expansion of the military complex is the
exception. Salaries within it are attractive. As of
2007, a private in the Sri Lanka army enjoyed a
basic pay of SL Rs12,000/month, rising with
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additional allowances for uniforms, service in the
operational areas, and frontline activities, the
take-home salary is approximately SL
Rs17,000–20,000/month. This is a high salary for
those from rural backgrounds, and importantly, a
steady income, paid to the soldier even if
disabled in war, and to his widow and dependants
if he dies in action. The FTZ women who aspire
to be military wives know that the military
income and the pensionable service they are part
of would give them an economic edge both within
rural and semi-urban social structures. The
promise of the good life becomes attainable, and
loyalty to the military institution becomes
inexorably linked to the means by which the
good life can be attained.
For a cash-strapped government faced with a
huge debt burden as a result of borrowing largely
to finance the war,12 there are other mechanisms
of ‘transfers, reciprocity and obligations’ which it
can dispense towards social control (Mbembe
2001: 75) and the construction of ‘a common
material imaginary’ (Mbembe 2001: 55). The
2006/523 government circular on Admission to
Grade One in government schools which provide
free education is an example. The circular
attracted widespread controversy and provoked a
tussle between the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka,
parliament and the cabinet. It brought into play
the alumni of powerful national schools, the
Lanka Teachers’ Union, educationists, school
administrators and the media. Yet in the contest
over the allotment of points to different
categories – school alumni, professional parents,
residential address, child’s aptitude, etc. – the
maximum of ten points granted to children of
parents in the military was not seriously
questioned either in the petitions to court or the
parliament, and only meagerly so in the media.
Under previous schemes, five seats per class
were held for the children of security personnel
(Hettiarachchi et al. 2007: 1). Awarding ten
points to each eligible military parent meant,
therefore, a dramatic increase in their capacity
to enrol their children in the best national
schools providing free education. The procedures
they had to follow also conferred greater
authority on the defence establishment charged
with vetting and endorsing the applications.
An emerging but already significant social
imaginary in Sri Lanka today has therefore
installed militarism and the good life as two
public goods, twin rationalities that animate
factory floors, privileges and allotments, life and
the law. If a new kind of politics in which the
voice of virtue became central in eighteenth
century European social imaginaries and had
fused self-love with love of country (Taylor 2004:
121), a parallel can be seen in Sri Lanka where
security is currently marketed as a public good,
and martial virtue folds into a promise of the
good life uniting both individual and collective
desire. These combined forces transact, in turn,
acquiescence to gendered violence in sites such
as the FTZs.13
A reordering of Sri Lankan society is therefore
under way, pointing to the entanglement of
militarisation, martial virtue, nationalism,
transnational capital, and gendered violence as
structural features of its social imaginary. The
army’s recent successes have bestowed on it an
unprecedented aura as a successful and
significant agent of a new, emerging Sri Lankan
nationhood. It is likely therefore that in the short
term at least, the army and its strategists will
play a major role in the country’s political sphere
and that its soldiers will continue to enjoy
socioeconomic capital. However, whether the
military will continue in this role is contingent
on many factors, including future LTTE strategy.
For instance, if the war morphs into long-term,
low-level guerrilla skirmishes, this will impact on
the army’s current public profile and growth. By
foregrounding the Sri Lanka military not as a
monolithic but complex institution that has
continuously occupied several identities, this
article has attempted to show that it is a partner
in a far more complex state–military relationship
than the one usually assumed; and that these
identities carry traces which can be called upon
to determine how the current military turn in Sri
Lanka will unfold. At the same time, Sri Lanka’s
insertion into global capital ensures that its
national security regime will continue to protect
transnational capital. A compliant labour force
that is also consumer-oriented is necessary for
the success of this enterprise. At the heart of this
matrix are rural Sri Lankan women who
experience gendered violence, social stigma and
poor working conditions, yet hold to the promise
of a good life which can be secured through and
by the military. Whatever the outcome of Sri
Lanka’s tragic war, these conditions ensure that
‘the public good’ will continue to be maintained
and marketed in military terms.
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Notes
1 Sunday Times, Colombo (6 July 2003),
Observation report by the commanders of the
Sri Lanka army, navy and air force on the
proposed Higher Defence Control Act, p. 11.
2 The Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (Peoples’
Liberation Front) comprised of southern Sri
Lankan youth-staged armed insurrections in
1971 and 1987–9.
3 The Federal Party’s call for a satyagraha in
Tamil-dominated areas in 1961 resulted in the
mobilisation of the army in the north and
east, as well as in the tea plantations in the
central hills.
4 One of the responses was the recruitment of a
batch of officers from non-elite Colombo
schools, the majority of Sinhala ethnicity
(SLAC 1999: 163). Today the identity of the
Sri Lanka army is largely Sinhala.
5 The return to barracks during the 2002–4
ceasefire was resented by some factions within
the military. The attitude of disabled soldiers
who voiced bitterness at how their sacrifices
had been in vain, marks this mood (de Mel
2007: 144–5) Yet despite such disgruntlement,
the military leadership bowed to civilian
authority with regard to the ceasefire.
6 An official ceremony to celebrate this event
was held at Independence Square on 19 July
2007 at which the military chiefs handed over
a scroll (thombu) to the President, reminiscent
of the ceremonies held by Sinhala kings when
territory had been conquered.
7 In Jaffna, regular roundups by the security
forces take place of people aged 17–30 and
their NICs are removed. These young people
are then instructed to collect their NICs at
the nearby camp where they undergo
interrogation and repeated scrutiny (Mustaffa
2007: 8).
8 This policy reversal points to how women’s
labour is ‘the easiest to cheapen’ (Enloe 1989:
159).
9 Juki is the brand of a sewing machine. In the
Sinhala language, kello means girls.
10 The women rarely work for more than five
years in any given FTZ after which they
return to their villages (Hewamanne and
Brow 2001: 22) or migrate internally
elsewhere following marriage.
11 www.bbc.co.uk/sinhala/news/story/2007/11/
071125_woman.shtml (accessed 11 March
2008).
12 The Sri Lanka government entered into a
controversial US$500 million bond issue in the
open market to shore up the country’s foreign
exchange reserves and finance the war.
Economists have warned of a massive debt
burden which peaked to SL Rs3,016 billion in
November 2007, a sum higher than the
national income in 2006 (Nation on Sunday
2008).
13 A parallel took place in LTTE-controlled
areas where the LTTE marriage bureau
arranged marriages among its cadre to
reproduce a militarised group imaginary.
These marriages were buttressed by special
entitlements that amounted ‘almost [to] the
creation of a special caste of persons’ (Samuel,
in press). Recently however, requiring cadre
for fighting, the LTTE declared a moratorium
on marriages until 40 years of age for men
and 35 years for women (Jeyaraj 2007b).
During its June 2006 recruitment drive it also
annulled marriages already contracted by
Tamil villagers to evade conscription (Jeyaraj
2007b). By doing so, the LTTE chose to install
its own juridical terms, overriding religious
rites and civil law.
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